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Temporal Causality and the Dynamics of Crime in Turkey 
 
 
 
                                                              Abstract 
 
This study is concerned with understanding of the factors of aggregate, nonviolent and violent 
crime categories in Turkey for the period 1965-2009. The determinants of all crime categories 
are related to selected socio-economic factors. Bounds testing approach to cointegration is 
employed to test the existence of long-run relationship amongst the variables.  Cointegration 
analysis yields the major contributors of crime are income and unemployment. The direction 
of causalities between the variables are established using within and out of sample causality 
tests. The findings from this study present the dynamics of aggregate, violent and non-violent 
crimes to design and implement any relevant policy measures to combat them. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The theoretical and empirical work on the socio-economic determinants of crime has grown 
substantially since the seminal study of Becker (1968), which suggests that the criminal 
behaves in a rational way and decides how to allocate time between legitimate and 
illegitimate activities, based on an income benefit-cost comparison, plus the likelihood of 
apprehension and conviction.  
Crime is a universal problem which has a detrimental effect on the functioning and stability of 
society. Moreover, prevention of crime is always a major public policy concern for all 
countries due to its socio-economic implications and costs. The extent of crimes may vary 
from country to country. However, a recent study of Harrendorf et al. (2010) provides some 
comparable international crime statistics based on the police records in homicide, assault, 
rape, robbery, burglary, motor vehichle theft and kidnapping rates for 144 countries. All crime 
rates are reported below per 100,000 population. As of 2004, approximately 490,000 deaths 
from international homicide occured revealing the rate of 7.6. In the same year, there were 
4973 Turkish homicides, which produced  the homicide rate of 7.07. As of 2006,  the mean 
assault rate in the world was 251 whilst it was 192.7 in Turkey. Considering rape rates, the 
mean world rape rate was 12 but Turkey had  a substantially low rape rate value of 2.5. Even 
though Harrendorf et al. (2010)  reports individually  the mean robbery rates for 144 countries 
but the mean value was not presented. The robbery rate for Turkey was revealed as 28.3 
which was classified as low. The mean burglary rate for the world was illustrated as 339 
whereas Turkey had a burglary rate of 216.9. As for the mean motor vehicle theft rates, 
Turkish rate, 45.9 is well below of the world average of 118. Finally, the kidnapping rates 
were compared, according to this rate, Turkey ranked the top with a rate of 14.84 whereas the 
mean world kidnapping was only 1.7.  
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The international crime statistics demonstrate that the crime rates in Turkey apart from the 
kidnapping rates are below the world averages indicating  low occurance of criminal 
activities. The crime rates in Turkey, nevertheless, seem to be on surge considering the data 
provided by Turkish Institute of Statistics (TSI), as of January 2011, there were 66997 
convicts in the Turkish prisons which convert as 91.52 conviction per 100,000 population and 
the Turkish prisons are overflowed by the number of convicts and the people arrested waiting 
for trials, currently 55407. However, it should be noted that an increase in conviction rate may 
not be directly imply a rise in crime activities as the extent and definitions of crime categories 
may be modified considerably regarding the crime time series data. 
An empirical study of crime in Turkey may provide useful policy tools for the policy makers 
to predict the future development on aggregate, violent and nonviolent crimes. The 
development in crime is a crucial factor in demands which are placed on the police and the 
criminal justice system. The empirical studies aiming at determining the causes of crime in 
Turkey are limited. For example, Kustepeli and Onel (2006) applies Johansen-Juselius (1990) 
cointegration approach to identify the determinants of crime using annual data of 1967-2004 
but it is well documented the adopted cointegration methodology is strictly for large samples. 
Therefore, the results from Kustepeli and Onel (2006) are  considered as flawed. The study of 
Comertler and Kar (2007) on crime is based on cross-section data, as a result it lacks of 
direction of causations between the variables. As far as this study is concerned, there exists no 
previous study that estimates empirically the determinants of crime in Turkey implementing 
the cointegration framework of Pesaran et al. (2001). Thus, this study aims at contributing to 
the existing literature by providing fresh evidence on the determinants of crime in addition to 
causality tests within and out of sample. 
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It is expected that the results from this study will have also some implications for the 
countries which are in the same development stage of Turkey. The extensions and 
modifications of the model presented here may also contribute to the enrichment of the 
existing literature on quantitative crime studies. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature 
review. Section 3 describes the study’s model and methodology. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results, and finally Section 5 concludes. 
 
II. A brief literature review 
 
Ehrlich (1973) further extended the research of Becker (1968) on crime and introduced initial 
econometrics model of offences. Ehrlich (1996) outlines the main themes of the literature on 
crime. The existing literature in crime economics divides the variables affecting the crime rate 
broadly into three categories: economic, socioeconomic-demographic, and deterrent.  
There are two most frequently used economic variables that are linked to criminal activities, 
unemployment and income. Cantor and Land (1985) proposed that there are two distinct and 
potentially counter balancing mechanisms which unemployment may affect crime rates in the 
aggregate: motivation and criminal opportunity. Former approach relates unemployment to 
crime rates positively in which a rise in unemployment leads to economic problems and 
increases the motivation to engage in criminal acts, see for example Reilly and Witt (1992) 
and Edmark (2005). Latter approach sets up an inverse relationship between these two 
variables indicating that economic deprivation leads reduction in the supply of worthwhile 
targets for the criminals.  A variant of the latter approach also suggests that a rise in 
unemployment rates leads to decrease in median family income and discourages a person 
from the decision to commit a crime as discussed in Britt (1994) and Melick (2004). The link 
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between income and crime is formed through three different ways. First an income decrease 
causes the need for returns from illegal activities; see for example Machin and Meghir (2000). 
Second an income increase sets the opportunities for criminal activities due to the large 
amount of stolen goods as pointed out in Lewitt (1999). Third a rise in income leads to 
outdoor activities, which stimulates potential crime activities, as discussed in Beki et al. 
(1999). This impact may occur in reverse order if a rise in income leads to a decrease in 
unemployment which alleviates the need for crime. As for the socioeconomic-demographic 
determinants of crime, urbanization appears to be one of key explanatory factor with an 
implication that it causes an increase in criminal activities, see for example Masih and Masih 
(1996). According to Gartner (1990), the rate of divorce is related to criminal activities as 
such that changing guardianship and the members of disturbed families pose risk everyone in 
the society. The impact of deterrent variables such as the number of police force or security 
expenditures, conviction rates, arrests on crime appear to be usually positive apart from some 
crime categories since they do not always lead to conviction or arrest, see for example 
Corman et al. (1987). 
There is a very large and growing body of research on different categories of crime linking 
them with a number of socio-economic determinants. Soares (2004) provides an extensive 
survey of the empirical studies on crime rates based on 40 studies. An earlier survey of 
Chiricos (1987) especially presents detailed evidence on the relationship between crime and 
unemployment rates from 63 research articles. 
Table 1 reveals that the empirical studies on crime is  based on a number of different 
empirical methods ranging from simple correlation to sophisticated panel econometric 
procedures with different categories of crime applying cross section to time series data. The 
selection of the explanatory variables largely depends on the availability of data and choice of 
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researchers indicating the diversity of the empirical evidence on crime. The recent studies 
usually tend to apply cointegration framework and time series data.  
Table 1. Summary results  of the selected empirical works on crime 
Author(s)/Year  Crime Category Period Data Method Country 
Beki et al . (1999) AC 1950-1993 TS EG The Netherlands 
Bodmand and Maulty (1997) DC 1982-1991 PTS OLS Australia 
Brown (2001) AC 1995 CS PBC South Africa 
Comertler and Kar (2007) DC 2000 CS OLS Turkey 
Canton and Land (1985) DC 1946-1982 TS OLS USA 
Corman et al. (1987) DC 1970-1984 TS VAR USA 
Detotto and Pulina (2009) DC 1970-2004 TS ARDL Italy 
Edmark (2005) AC and DC 1988-1999 Panel PEM Sweden 
Funk and Kugler (2003) DC 1984-1998 TS VAR Switzerland 
Habibullah and Baharom (2009) DC 1973-2003 TS ARDL Malaysia 
Hale (1998) DC 1946-1991 TS VECM UK 
Kustepeli and Onel (2006) DC 1967-2004 TS VECM Turkey 
Lee and Holoviak (2006) AC and DC various TS VECM 5 Countries 
Luiz (2000) DC 1960-1993 TS VECM South Africa 
Machin and Meghir (2004) AC 1975-1996 TS OLS/IV UK 
Masih and Masih (1996) DC 1963-1990 TS VECM Australia 
Meera and Jayakumar (1995) DC 1968-1988 TS TSLS Malaysia 
Nikolaos and Alexandros (2009) AC 1971-2006 TS VECM Greece 
Narayan and Smyth (2004) DC 1964-2001 TS ARDL Australia 
Saridakis (2004) AC and DC 1960-2000 TS VECM USA 
Scorcu and Cellini (1998) DC 1951-1994 TS ECM Italy 
Shoesmith (2010) DC 1970-2003 TS VECM USA 
Reilly and Witt (1992) DC 1974-1988 TS OLS Scotland 
Keys: AC (Aggregate Crime), DC (Disaggregate Crime), EG (Engle-Granger), CS (Cross-Section), TS (Time Series), PTS (Pooled 
Time Series), Likelihood),  OLS (Ordinary Least Squares),  PBC (Pearson Pairwise Correlation), IV (Instrumental Variables), TSLS 
(Two Stage Least Squares), ECM (Error Correction Model), PEM (Panel Econometric Methods), VAR (Vector Auto Regression), 
ARDL (Auto Regressive Distributed Lag), VECM (Vector Error Correction Model). 
 
 
III.  Model and methodology 
 
Following the empirical literature on crime,  this study adopts the following long-run 
relationship between crime, income, unemploymet, divorce, urbanization and security 
expenditures in double linear logarithmic form as:  
 
 ttttttj saradauayaac ε++++++= 543210 ,                                                      (1) 
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where the subscript t indexes time period with t =1965,…, 2009; ct is  convicts  per 100,000 
people;  j indexes convict variable with j=0 (aggregate crime is the combination of nonviolent 
and violent offences), 1 (nonviolent crime consist of  property, burglary, motor vehicle theft, 
fraud, corruption,  etc.), and 2 (violent crime includes homicide, assault, rape, and 
kidnapping); yt  is real income per capita; ut is  unemployment rate; dt is  divorce rate per 
1000; rt is urbanization rate; st is real public security expenditures per capita;  and tε  is the 
classical error term. 
 
Cointegration 
 
Recent advances in econometric literature dictate that the long-run relation in equation (1) 
should incorporate the short-run dynamic adjustment process. It is possible to achieve this aim 
by expressing equation (1) in an error-correction model as suggested in Pesaran et al. (2001). 
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This approach, also known as autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL), provides the short-run 
and long-run estimates simultaneously. Short-run effects are reflected by the estimates of the 
coefficients attached to all first-differenced variables. The long-run effects of the explanatory 
variables on the dependent variable are obtained by the estimates of β8-β12 that are normalized 
on β7. The inclusion of the lagged-level variables in equation (2) is verified through the 
bounds testing procedure, which is based on the Fisher (F) or Wald (W)-statistics. This 
procedure is considered as the pre-testing stage of the ARDL cointegration method. 
Accordingly, a joint significance test that implies no cointegration hypothesis, (H0: all  7β to 
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012 =β ), against the alternative hypothesis, (H1: at least one of  7β to 012 ≠β ) should be 
performed for equation (2). The F/W test used for this procedure has a non-standard 
distribution. Thus, Pesaran et al. (2001) compute two sets of critical values for a given 
significance level with and without a time trend. One set assumes that all variables are I(0) 
and the other set assumes they are all I(1). If the computed F/W-statistic exceeds the upper 
critical bounds value, then the H0 is rejected, implying cointegration. In order to determine 
whether the adjustment of variables is toward their long-run equilibrium values, estimates of 
β7-β12 are used to construct an error-correction term (EC). Then lagged-level variables in 
equation (2) are replaced by ECt-1 forming a modified version of equation (2) as follows: 
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Equation (3) is re-estimated one more time using the same lags previously. A negative and 
statistically significant estimation of λ  not only represents the speed of adjustment but also 
provides an alternative means of supporting cointegration between the variables. Pesaran et 
al. (2001) cointegration approach has some methodological advantages in comparison to other 
single cointegration procedures. Reasons for the ARDL are: i) endogeneity problems and 
inability to test hypotheses on the estimated coefficients in the long-run associated with the 
Engle-Granger (1987) method are avoided; ii) the long and short-run coefficients of the model 
in question are estimated simultaneously; iii) the ARDL approach to testing for the existence 
of a long-run relationship between the variables in levels is applicable irrespective of whether 
the underlying regressors are purely stationary I(0), purely non-stationary I(1), or mutually 
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cointegrated; iv) the small sample properties of the bounds testing approach are far superior to 
that of multivariate cointegration, as argued in Narayan (2005). 
 
Augmented Granger Causality 
 
The Granger representation theorem suggests that there will be Granger causality in at least 
one direction if there exists a cointegration relationship among the variables in equation (1), 
providing that they are integrated order of one. Engle and Granger (1987) caution that the 
Granger causality test, which is conducted in the first-differenced variables by means of a 
VAR, will be misleading in the presence of cointegration. Therefore, an inclusion of an 
additional variable to the VAR system, such as the error correction term would help us to 
capture the long-run relationship. To this end, an augmented form of the Granger causality 
test involving the error correction term is formulated in a multivariate pth order vector error 
correction model. 
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)1( L−  is the lag operator. ECt-1 is the error correction term, which is obtained from the long-
run relationship described in equation (1), and it is not included in equation (4) if one finds no 
cointegration amongst the vector in question.  The Granger causality test may be applied to 
equation (4) as follows: i) by checking statistical significance of the lagged differences of the 
variables for each vector; this is a measure of short-run causality; and ii) by examining 
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statistical significance of the error-correction term for the vector that there exists a long-run 
relationship. As a passing note, one should reveal that equation (3) and (4) do not represent 
competing error-correction models because equation (3) may result in different lag structures 
on each regressors at the actual estimation stage; see Pesaran et al. (2001) for details and its 
mathematical derivation. All error-correction vectors in equation (4) are estimated with the 
same lag structure that is determined in unrestricted VAR framework. 
 
Variance Decompositions 
 
Establishing  Granger causality is restricted to essentially within sample tests, which are 
useful in distinguishing  the plausible Granger exogeneity or endogenity of the dependent 
variable in the sample period, but are unable to deduce the degree of exogenity of the 
variables the beyond the sample period. To examine this issue, the decomposition of variance 
of the variables may be used. The variance decompositions (VDCs) measure the percentage of 
a variable’s forecast error variance that occurs as the result of a shock (or an innovation) from 
a variable in the system. The VDCs estimate the percentage contribution of each variable 
including the dependent variable in the total variation of the dependent variable. Sims (1980) 
notes that if a variable is truly exogenous with respect to the other variables in the system, 
own innovations will explain all of its forecast error variance (i.e., almost 100%). By looking 
at VDCs policy makers gather additional insight as to what percentage (of the forecast error 
variance) of each variable is explained by its determinant.  
 
 
IV. Results 
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Annual data over the period 1965-2009 were used to estimate equation (2) and (3) by the 
ARDL cointegration procedure of Pesaran et al. (2001). Variable definition and sources of 
data are cited in Appendix.  
To implement the Pesaran et al. (2001) procedure, one has to ensure that none of the 
explanatory variables in equation (1) is above I(1). In the presence of I(2), the critical values 
computed by the Pesaran et al. (2001) cointegration procedure are not valid. Three tests were 
used to test unit roots in the variables: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (henceforth, ADF) (1979, 
1981), Phillips-Perron (henceforth, PP) (1988), and Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (henceforth, 
ERS) (1996). Unit root tests results are displayed in Table 2. Table 2 demonstrates that none 
of the variables included in the model are beyond I(1). Consequently, the results warrant 
implementing the Pesaran et al. (2001) procedure. Visual inspections of the variables in 
logarithm show no structural breaks.  
 
Table 2.  Unit root results 
Variables ADF  PP ERS 
ct,0
 2.55 2.53 1.48 
ct,1 2.64 2.29 1.32 
ct,2 1.77 1.56 1.36 
yt 0.97 0.58 1.35 
ut 2.30 2.56 1.70 
dt 1.46 1.23 1.04 
rt 1.77 0.65 1.94 
st 3.72
* 3.48* 2.79* 
∆ct,0 7.75
* 9.32* 5.08* 
∆ct,1 6.23
* 8.02* 4.27* 
∆ct,2 6.10
* 7.50* 4.29* 
∆yt 5.22
* 5.50* 5.26* 
∆ut 4.46
* 5.51* 4.47* 
∆dt 3.05 5.29
* 3.77* 
∆rt 3.02 4.10
* 2.90 
∆st 3.09 7.14
* 3.24 
Notes: Sample levels are 1966-2009 and differences are 1967-
2009. The sample level unit root regressions include a constant 
and a trend. The differenced level unit root regressions are with a 
constant and without a trend. All test statistics are expressed in 
absolute terms for convenience. Rejection of unit root hypothesis 
is indicated with an asterisk. ∆ stands for first difference. 
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In order to test the existence of  a long-run cointegrating relationship amongst the variables of 
equation (1), a two-step procedure to estimate the ARDL representation model was carrried 
out. First, in search of the  optimal lag length of the differenced variables of the short-run 
coefficients in equation (2), unrestricted Vector Auto Regression (VAR) was employed by 
means of Akaike Information criteria (AIC). The results suggest the optimal lag length for all 
crime models is 2, but this stage of the results is not presented here to conserve space. Second, 
a bound F/W-test was applied to equation (2) in order to determine whether the dependent and 
independent variables are cointegrated in each crime model. The results of the bounds F/W-
testing are reported in Table 3.  It can bee seen from Table 3 that the computed F/W statistics 
are  above the upper bound values in all cases of crime models thus implying cointegration 
relations. 
 
Table 3. The results of F and W tests for cointegration. 
Panel A: The assumed long-run relationship: ),,,,(/ 0 srduycWF   
F-statistic 95% LB 95% UB 90% LB 90% UB 
4.15 3.00 4.25 2.48 3.65 
W-statistic     
24.92 18.04 25.51 14.89 21.91 
Panel B: The assumed long-run relationship:
 
),,,,(/ 1 srduycWF  
F-statistic 95% LB 95% UB 90% LB 90% UB 
4.94 3.00 4.25 2.48 3.65 
W-statistic     
29.64 18.04 25.51 14.89 21.91 
Panel C: The assumed long-run relationship:
 
),,,,(/ 2 srduycWF  
F-statistic 95% LB 95% UB 90% LB 90% UB 
4.51 3.00 4.25 2.48 3.65 
W-statistic     
27.07 18.04 25.51 14.89 21.91 
If the test statistic lies between the bounds, the test is inconclusive. If it is above the 
upper bound (UB), the null hypothesis of no level effect is rejected. If it is the below 
the lower bound (LB), the null hypothesis of no level effect cannot be rejected.  
 
The ARDL  representation equation was estimated to obtain the long-run and short-run 
coefficients simultaneously. The results are displayed in Tables 4, 5 and 6, respectively. The 
long-run results received from equation (2) are displayed in Panel A of Tables 4, 5 and 6, 
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respectively. The error-correction representations from the estimations of equation (3) are 
presented  in  Panel B of Tables 4, 5 and 6, respectively. The stability of coefficients in the 
error correction models were also checked via the graphical representations of CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ tests of Brown et al. (1975). The results  display that all coefficients in the error-
correction models are stable and there exist no structural breaks. These results are not 
illustrated here due space considerations.The overall regression diagnostics in all models 
suggest that the econometric results are satisfactory to infer from them.. Regarding the 
aggregate crime model, in the long-run all the parameters seem to be carrying expected signs 
but three of them: income, unemployment and divorce rates are statistically and individually  
significant. Amongst these variables, income variable has the highest  partial impact on crime 
indicating that a 1% increase in real per capita income decreases aggregate crime by 1.60% in 
the long-run. The elasticity of aggregate crime with respect to unemployment rate is -0.53 
implying that a 1% rise in the unemployment rate will  reduce the criminal opportunities by 
0.53%. The impact of unemployment on crime is frequently tested  as it is considered as one 
of major determinants of crime offenses. Chiricos (1987) for extensive survey linking the 
unemployment and crime rates. As for the divorce variable, its affect on the aggregate crime 
level is rather noticeable since a 1%  increase  in divorce rates leads to 0.36% in the aggregate 
crime.  The short-run estimation of the aggregate crime model reveals that the estimated error 
correction term is very high (-0.85) therefore any disequlibrium between the short-run and 
long-run is eliminated within a short-period of time. In other words, the aggregate crime 
equation is above or below its equilibrium level, it adjusts by 85% within the first year. The 
full convergence to its equilibrium level takes a little less than one and a half  years. 
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Table 4. Aggregate Crime Model ARDL cointegration results  
Panel A. 
Long-run results. 
Panel B. 
Error correction representation results. 
Dependent variable  0,tc  Dependent variable  0,tc∆  
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
ty  -1.6068
* 6.1620 
ty∆  -0.9805
* 4.3911 
tu  -0.5291
* 2.8864 
tu∆  -0.3181
* 2.9173 
td   0.3620
* 3.7559 
td∆   0.2913
* 3.2662 
tr  
 0.6479 1.1785 
tr∆   0.5670
* 2.5141 
ts  
-0.1423 0.7820 
ts∆   0.4834 1.5775 
Constant 23.099* 10.618 
1−tEC  -0.8570
* 4.3542 
Panel C. 
Diagnostic tests. 
2R        0.54 F-statistic 7.58
* )1(2SCχ     0.24 )1(
2
FFχ  0.11 
RSS       0.95 DW-statistic 2.19 )2(2'χ     3.39 )1(
2
Hχ  0.47 
 *,  **, and, *** indicate, 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. RSS stands for residual sum of squares. T-
ratios are in absolute values.
2
SCχ , 2FFχ , 2'χ , and 2Hχ  are Lagrange multiplier statistics for tests of residual 
correlation, functional form mis-specification, non-normal errors and heteroskedasticity, respectively. These statistics 
are distributed as Chi-squared variates with degrees of freedom in parentheses. The critical values for 84.3)1(
2 =χ  
and 99.5)2(
2 =χ  are at 5% significance level. 
 
The nonviolent crime model is displayed in Table 5 indicating that income, unemployment 
and divorce rate variables are also here statistically and individually significant in the long-
run. In fact, the order of their impacts on the dependent variables follow the same order as in 
the case of the pervious model but the magnitudes are different. For example, the elasticity of 
the nonviolent crime with respect to income is almost -1 impying that there is an exact 
proportional change between these variables but it is substantially less in comparison to the 
aggregate crime results. The partial impact of unemployment on the nonviolent crime is here 
much higher than the previous category of crime. Similarly, the elasticity of the nonviolent 
crime is almost twice more than the aggregate crime model. Nevertheless, the error correction 
term seems to be quite close in both crime models. 
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Table 5. 'onviolent Crime Model ARDL cointegration results  
Panel A. 
Long-run results. 
Panel B. 
Error correction representation results. 
Dependent variable  1,tc  Dependent variable  1,tc∆  
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
ty  -0.9931
* 2.9345 
ty∆  -0.9276
** 2.3731 
tu   -0.8096
* 3.9908 
tu∆  -0.7562
* 3.8019 
td    0.6721
* 5.6743 
td∆  0.1055 0.3934 
tr  
  0.2563 0.5015 
tr∆  0.2394 0.4943 
ts  
 0.0361 0.2554 
ts∆  0.0126
** 2.2311 
Constant 18.133* 7.9132 
1−tEC  -0.9340
* 6.3036 
Panel C. 
Diagnostic tests. 
2R        0.52 F-statistic 7.11
* )1(2SCχ     2.39 )1(
2
FFχ  2.66 
RSS       0.65 DW-statistic 2.27 )2(2'χ     5.19 )1(
2
Hχ  1.28 
 *,  **, and, *** indicate, 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. RSS stands for residual sum of squares. T-
ratios are in absolute values.
2
SCχ , 2FFχ , 2'χ , and 2Hχ  are Lagrange multiplier statistics for tests of residual 
correlation, functional form mis-specification, non-normal errors and heteroskedasticity, respectively. These statistics 
are distributed as Chi-squared variates with degrees of freedom in parentheses. The critical values for 84.3)1(
2 =χ  and 
99.5)2(2 =χ  are at 5% significance level. 
 
Considering the last category of crime model,  even though income and divorce rate variables 
are statitically and individually significant as in the case of both previous models. However, 
the unemployment variable is not statistically significant in this crime model. Instead, 
urbanization variable appears to be statitically significant. The magnitude of the partial impact 
of income on the violent crime level is the almost same as the non-violent crime in the long-
run. The elasticity of violent crime with respect to divorce rate is considerably less than the 
nonviolent crime category but substantially higher than the aggregate crime model. It seems 
that urbanization  is only statistically significant in the case of this category crime. Its 
estimated coefficent indicates that a 1% rise in the urbanization rate reduces the violent crime 
by 1.42%. As people live close by it is likely that crime rates will drop in comparison to 
sparsely located residents. As for the error correction term, its magnitute between the 
aggregate and nonviolent crime models. 
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Table 6. Violent Crime Model ARDL cointegration results  
Panel A. 
Long-run results. 
Panel B. 
Error correction representation results. 
Dependent variable  2,tc  Dependent variable  2,tc∆  
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
ty  -1.0522
* 3.0300 
ty∆  -0.9584
** 2.3731 
tu   -0.0433 0.2090 tu∆  -0.0337
*** 1.8458 
td   0.5484
* 4.7717 
td∆  0.1960 0.7411 
tr  
 -1.4247** 2.6725 
tr∆  -1.2976
** 2.4544 
ts  
-0.0406 0.3058 
ts∆  0.0224
*** 1.7908 
Constant 19.577* 8.2566 
1−tEC  -0.9108
* 5.7330 
Panel C. 
Diagnostic tests. 
2R        0.40 F-statistic 4.95
* )1(2SCχ     0.10 )1(
2
FFχ  1.22 
RSS       0.63 DW-statistic 1.97 )2(2'χ     0.43 )1(
2
Hχ  0.31 
 *,  **, and, *** indicate, 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. RSS stands for residual sum of squares. T-
ratios are in absolute values.
2
SCχ , 2FFχ , 2'χ , and 2Hχ  are Lagrange multiplier statistics for tests of residual 
correlation, functional form mis-specification, non-normal errors and heteroskedasticity, respectively. These statistics 
are distributed as Chi-squared variates with degrees of freedom in parentheses. The critical values for 84.3)1(
2 =χ  and 
99.5)2(2 =χ  are at 5% significance level. 
 
The results of Granger causality tests presented in Tables 7, 8 and 9, respectively,  reveal the 
existence of the long-run causality in the case of each crime categories. In the long-run, 
causality runs from police expenditures, urbanization, divorce, unemployment and income to 
crimes. Howevever, the short-run causalities differ amongst the models. Regarding the pairs 
of causalities between only crime and explanatory variables, the following points are 
identified. There exists a feedback relationship between aggregate crime level and per capita 
income. The causality running from crime to per capita income suggests that crime is a 
detrimental factor for the economic growth in the short-run. Similarly, there is also a feedback 
relationship amongst nonviolent crime and unemployment rate. Finally, it is established that a 
unilateral causality running from nonviolent crime to divorce rate and violent crime Granger-
causes urbanization. 
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Table 7. Results of Granger causality for aggregate crime model
 
                                              F-statistics (probability) 
Dependent 
Variable  
0,tc∆  ty∆  tu∆  td∆  tr∆  ts∆  1−tEC  
(t-statistic) 
0,tc∆  - 3.99
* 
(0.01) 
0.62 
(0.60) 
1.28 
(0.30) 
0.35 
(0.78) 
1.17 
(0.33) 
-0.87* 
(0.02) 
ty∆  3.94
* 
(0.02) 
- 1.82 
(1.16) 
1.41 
(0.26) 
0.88 
(0.46) 
0.84 
(0.48) 
 
tu∆  0.80 
(0.50) 
0.62 
(0.54) 
- 1.16 
(0.34) 
0.57 
(0.63) 
0.88 
(0.46) 
 
td∆  0.42 
(0.74) 
1.39 
(0.26) 
0.39 
(0.26) 
- 1.18 
(0.33) 
0.38 
(0.76) 
 
tr∆  0.13 
(0.94) 
2.63** 
(0.07) 
0.46 
(0.70) 
1.29 
(0.30) 
- 0.92 
(0.44) 
 
ts∆  0.70 
(0.55) 
0.84 
(0.48) 
1.27 
(0.30) 
0.46 
(0.70) 
1.47 
(0.24) 
-  
Causality inference:  ct,0 ↔ yt , yt → rt  
*
 and 
** 
indicate 5 %  and 10 % significance levels, respectively. The probability values are in 
brackets. The optimal lag length is 2 and is based on SBC. 
 
 
 
Table 8. Results of Granger causality for nonviolent crime model
 
                                              F-statistics (probability) 
Dependent 
Variable  
1,tc∆  ty∆  tu∆  td∆  tr∆  ts∆  1−tEC  
(t-statistic) 
1,tc∆  - 1.34 
(0.28) 
2.30** 
(0.10) 
0.17 
(0.91) 
0.29 
(0.82) 
1.08 
(0.37) 
-0.82* 
(0.00) 
ty∆  1.11 
(0.36) 
- 2.88* 
(0.05) 
0.48 
(0.69) 
0.62 
(0.60) 
1.39 
(0.27) 
 
tu∆  3.48
* 
(0.03) 
2.72** 
(0.06) 
- 3.54* 
(0.03) 
1.14 
(0.35) 
0.52 
(0.66) 
 
td∆  2.33
** 
(0.10) 
3.36* 
(0.03) 
1.22 
(0.32) 
- 2.46** 
(0.08) 
0.72 
(0.54) 
 
tr∆  1.40 
(0.26) 
3.71* 
(0.02) 
1.16 
(0.34) 
2.39** 
(0.09) 
- 1.20 
(0.32) 
 
ts∆  1.55 
(0.22) 
1.29 
(0.29) 
0.76 
(0.52) 
0.15 
(0.92) 
2.16 
(0.11) 
-  
Causality inference: ct,1↔ ut, ct,1 → dt, dt → ut, yt ↔ ut, yt → dt, rt ↔dt, yt → rt 
*
 and 
** 
indicate 5 %  and 10 % significance levels, respectively. The probability values are in 
brackets. The optimal lag length is 2 and is based on SBC. 
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Table 9. Results of Granger causality for violent crime model
 
                                              F-statistics (probability) 
Dependent 
Variable  
2,tc∆  ty∆  tu∆  td∆  tr∆  ts∆  1−tEC  
(t-statistic) 
2,tc∆  - 0.41 
(0.74) 
1.62 
(0.21) 
0.14 
(0.93) 
0.56 
(0.64) 
0.99 
(0.41) 
-0.97* 
(4.18) 
ty∆  0.69 
(0.56) 
- 2.29** 
(0.10) 
0.72 
(0.54) 
0.22 
(0.88) 
0.89 
(0.45) 
 
tu∆  1.68 
(0.19) 
1.75 
(0.18) 
- 3.40* 
(0.03) 
0.61 
(0.60) 
0.55 
(0.65) 
 
td∆  0.93 
(0.43) 
1.96 
(0.14) 
0.59 
(0.62) 
- 1.34 
(0.28) 
0.59 
(0.62) 
 
tr∆  2.60
** 
(0.07) 
3.42* 
(0.03) 
1.57 
(0.22) 
1.91 
(0.15) 
- 1.82 
(0.17) 
 
ts∆  1.06 
(0.38) 
0.81 
(0.49) 
1.18 
(0.33) 
0.26 
(0.84) 
2.47** 
(0.08) 
-  
Causality inference: ct,2 → rt, ut → yt, dt → ut, yt → rt, rt → st 
*
 and 
** 
indicate 5 %  and 10 % significance levels, respectively. The probability values are in 
brackets. The optimal lag length is 2 and is based on SBC. 
 
Individually only income and unemployment Granger-caused aggregate nonviolent crime 
categories in the short-run as indicated by  the significance of the F-tests. The short-run 
disequlibrium in the long-run cointegrating  relationships did Granger-caused in all types of 
crimes since the lagged error term is statiscally significant in all the models. This finding is 
futher supported by the post-sample VDCs as illustrated in Table 10. A substantial portion of 
the variance of  aggregate crime (88.26%) is explained by its own innovations in the short-
run, for example, at two-year horizon. In the long-run, for example, at ten-year horizon, the 
portion of the variance of aggregate crime gradually decreases to 81.34% implying that other 
variables explains about 19% of the shocks in the aggregate crime. The within-sample VECM 
results indicate nonviolent crime was Granger-caused by unemployment. The post-sample 
VDCs further confirms this finding. Adding the relative strenght of income (8.85%) and 
divorce rates (4.82%) to this impact, about 45.51% of the shocks in the nonviolent crime at 
ten-year horizon are accounted for the shocks in the unemployment, income and divorce rates. 
VECM estimates analysis suggests that violent crimes were Granger caused partly by growing 
unemployment rates. This finding is slightly  confirmed by VDCs in the long-run too. 
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However, a major portion (62.17%) of the variance in its forecast error at ten-year horizon  is 
accounted for by  the summation of five explanatory variables: income (31.96%), 
unemployment (2.72%), divorce (7.03%), urbanization (5.39%), and security expenditures 
(15.07%) 
 
 
Table 10. Decomposition of Variance 
                        Percentage of forecast variance explained by innovations in: 
 Crime  rate Income Unemployment  Divorce  Urbanization  Security exp. 
Years   Aggregate crime    
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 88.26 2.26 0.97 0.51 6.37 1.60 
3 85.13 2.18 1.79 0.44 8.91 1.52 
4 85.21 1.86 1.74 0.38 9.37 1.36 
5 84.36 1.71 1.74 0.33 10.47 1.37 
10 81.34 1.12 1.51 0.19 14.42 1.28 
   'on-violent crime    
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 86.67 0.13 10.25 2.92 0.01 0.01 
3 76.98 1.73 18.80 2.81 0.01 0.16 
4 68.32 4.41 24.07 2.99 0.01 0.16 
5 58.80 6.50 28.60 4.07 0.01 0.15 
10 53.56 8.85 31.84 4.82 0.07 0.14 
   Violent crime    
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 98.44 0.84 0.01 0.21 0.39 0.01 
3 90.41 7.96 0.38 0.58 0.44 0.20 
4 77.59 18.12 1.10 2.26 0.36 0.54 
5 68.21 24.79 1.89 3.80 0.51 0.78 
10 51.37 31.96 2.72 7.03 5.39 15.07 
Notes: Figures in the first column refer to horizons (i.e., number of years). All figures are rounded to two decimal 
places. The covariances matrices of errors from all the VECMs appeared to be very small and approaching zero 
suggesting that the combinations of all the variables in these models are linear. Therefore, the ortohogonal case for 
the variance decompositions are applied. 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
This study has attempted to identify the causes of crime in Turkey using the cointegration 
framework of Pesaran et al. (2001). The results indicate that the existence of cointegration 
between crime categories, income, unemployment, divorce, urbanization and security 
expenditures. As a result, although in the short-run, one or two determinants may not be 
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related to crime in a temporal causal relationship, in the long-run, it is the dynamic interaction 
of all these variables with each type of crime is causally related. In regards to long-run partial 
impacts of explanatory variables on crime categories, income seems to be main factor in 
determining in all crime rates. This impact highest in total crime category but it is quite 
similar in the case of violent and non-violent crime. Unemployment is another major factor 
contributor to all crime rates. However, in the case of violent crime, unemployment is 
statistically insignificant. Divorce seems to be a positive effect in rising crime and that is 
particularly high in the case of non-violent crime. It is found that urbanization is contributing 
to crime if they are in the category of violent offence. Although, the impact of security 
expenditures appear to have deterring effect on crime but they are statistically not significant. 
In within sample causality tests suggest that there is a long causality running from police 
expenditures, urbanization, divorce, unemployment and income to all crimes. In the short-run, 
a bilateral causality between aggregate crime and income is detected. Similarly, a feedback 
relationship is established between non-violent crime and income. This finding of a long-run 
temporal relationship between all these variables is very important for the policy designers to 
identify causation amongst the variables. Considering out of sample causalities,  in the short-
run, all crimes are mainly self-feeding but as time horizon increases the causes of crime are 
supported by income, unemployment and divorce rates. Security expenditures, however, 
appears to deterring effect only in the case of violent crime in the long-run. The results from 
this analysis allow policy designers obtain additional insight as to what percentage of each 
category of crime is explained by each determinant. As a passing note, it is plausible to 
suggest that the overall results of this study could have been improved significantly if the 
conviction rates were replaced by crime index. 
The findings from this study present the dynamics of aggregate, violent and non-violent crime 
to design and implement any relevant policy measures to combat them. With regard to future 
 21 
scenarios of economic and development, the estimated model elasticities enable the policy 
makers to predict the future development on aggregate, violent and non-violent crime.  
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Appendix 
 
Data definition and sources 
Data are collected from three different sources, namely;  Statistical Indicators of Turkish 
Institute of Statistics (TSI), Main Economic Indicators (MEI) of OECD and  World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank.  
c0, c1, c2, :  are the convicts of total, non-violent and violent crime offences per 100,000 
people in logarithm, respectively. Non-violent offences consist of  property, burglary, motor 
vehicle theft, fraud, corruption,  etc. Violent crimes include homicide, assault, rape, and 
kidnapping. Source: TSI. 
y :  is the per capita real income in Turkish lira based on 2000 prices in logarithm. Source: 
WDI. 
u : is the unemployment rate  in logarithm. Source: MEI. 
d : is the crude divorce rate per 1000 people in logarithm. Source: TSI. 
r: is the urbanization rate in logarithm. The urbanization rate is the proportion of people living 
in the cities. Source: WDI. 
s: is the per capita real public security expenditures in Turkish lira based on 2000 prices in 
logaritm. The public security expenditures contain police and gendarme forces in the cities 
and country sides. Source: TSI. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric estimations are presented in 
Table 11. 
 
Table 11.  Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
ct,0
 46.83 17.20 86.86 14.75 
ct,1 18.63 6.59 33.42 9.11 
ct,2 18.76 10.05 44.34 18.76 
yt 16029.6 3673.7 21383.7 9396.5 
ut 7.97 1.88 13.05 3.06 
rt 0.57 0.37 1.41 0.27 
dt 53.09 11.66 70.1 34.2 
st 170.87 99.93 410.61 37.59 
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